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I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom to speak one’s mind free of persecution has long occu-
pied a place of particular gravity in American culture.  At its core is
the idea that government cannot control our access to certain ideas by
restricting some messages but not others—it prohibits government
from discriminating against content.1  To be workable, however, this
right must acknowledge exceptions, and it does so by allowing dis-
crimination against certain types of speech to bypass this strict First
Amendment protection.2  So while the Supreme Court prohibits dis-
crimination of most content, there are a few types of speech, such as
libel or incitement,3 that receive more lenient treatment.  Accordingly,
1. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); Nadine
Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Con-
tent-Based Speech Restrictions, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 67–68 (“[T]he core
value underlying the First Amendment: the right of individuals to make their
own choices about what ideas to express, receive, and believe, free of governmen-
tal limitations or manipulation.”).
2. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 961
(4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY].
3. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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to determine the level of protection, judges must look to the type of
speech in question, an approach that forms the fundamental frame-
work for content-discrimination analysis.4
In a recent case, United States v. Stevens,5 the Court established a
clear standard for such categorization, declaring it would recognize ex-
ceptions only for speech that had a firm tradition of regulation.6  De-
spite its focus on tradition, the Stevens opinion provided little
guidance as to whether this held true when children were the recipi-
ents of the speech, in which case speech receives lesser protection.7
Yet because the  Court never precisely outlined these differences, it
was uncertain whether Stevens’s requirement of traditional regulation
applied in all contexts of speech categorization, or whether categories
could sometimes deserve formal recognition without satisfying this
fairly strict requirement.  On occasion, First Amendment analysis can
change depending on its setting,8 medium,9 or audience.10  So, it
seems at least plausible that such situations might be exempt from
the full impact of Stevens.
Indeed, this was the complication in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n,11 where the Court faced a statute limiting the sale of
violent video games to minors.12  The Court had to determine whether
such speech deserved recognition as a formal category, exempted from
full First Amendment protection.  Without a clear answer from the
young Stevens opinion, the initial dividing point was simply whether
the fact of a child audience deserves special merit when considering
the recognition of a new category, or whether such speech must have
a tradition of regulation, as generally mandated by Stevens.  There,
the Court fractured in its application of Stevens.  While the majority
straightforwardly applied the case without so much as a second
4. See Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American
Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 918 (2009); Keith Werhan, The Liberaliza-
tion of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 53 (1994).
5. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
6. Id. at 1586.
7. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (“[A] State or mu-
nicipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials availa-
ble to youths than on those available to adults.”).
8. Many authoritarian environments are treated differently for First Amendment
inquiries. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1188–98 (discussing military, pris-
ons, and schools as meriting added governmental protection).
9. The content of broadcast media, for example, can be more heavily regulated than
cable, telephone, and internet, at least with respect to indecent speech. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1071.
10. For example, the definition of obscenity can vary depending on the age of audi-
ence members. See infra section II.C.
11. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
12. Id. at 2732–33.
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glance,13 Justice Alito disagreed, suggesting New York v. Ginsberg14
supplied the standard more appropriate for speech toward children.15
Ginsberg stands as an example of speech receiving lessened protec-
tion when children are involved,16 so Justice Alito’s choice raises the
interesting possibility of an exception from the Stevens requirements
for recognizing a speech category.  Although the majority rebutted
some of Justice Alito’s attacks, it gave little discussion as to why Gins-
berg, a case dealing with treatment of speech directed at children, was
inapplicable in a case involving speech directed at children.  Justice
Alito similarly fails to explain, in his critique of the majority, why it
really is the appropriate case or how it fits the analysis.  In light of
this underexplored disagreement, this Note examines that possibility
and its ramifications in more depth and supports the majority’s deci-
sion, at least in terms of jurisprudential harmony, to avoid the reason-
ing in Ginsberg.  In Part II, this Note examines First Amendment
jurisprudence, focusing particularly on the method of categorizing
speech and the Court’s past treatment of speech toward children.  In
Part III, the discussion turns to the possibility of using the Ginsberg
decision as precedent, analyzing whether and how such reasoning
could apply as an exception to the method established in Stevens.  The
resulting standard would likely be a rational basis test creating a sig-
nificant difference from standard categorization methodology.  The
Court’s past treatment of children, however, shows such a large differ-
ence to be unwarranted.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Categorization and Unprotected Speech Under the First
Amendment
The First Amendment establishes the right to freedom of expres-
sion with a short and simple statement: “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”17  The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has always avoided a literal interpretation, allowing certain
speech-abridging laws to survive constitutional analysis.18  In fact,
until around World War I, the Supreme Court was largely unsympa-
thetic to First Amendment protection and consistently avoided or
struck down free speech claims.19  Without evidence of much legal
13. Id. at 2734.
14. New York v. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
15. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring).
16. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636–37 (allowing a state to restrict a minor’s access to sex-
ual content where it could not restrict an adult’s access).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).
19. David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514,
520 (1981).
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theory or doctrine, the Court appeared simply to permit government
regulation whenever speech had a “bad tendency.”20  But without
clear guidelines, the Court’s determination rested solely on an ad hoc
analysis.21
After World War I, at the urging of a number of scholars,22 the
Court established a test in which the government could only regulate
speech if it exhibited a clear and present danger of “bring[ing] about
the substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent.”23  Al-
though use of this test was somewhat inconsistent over the following
four decades,24 it did reflect a move toward some structure in First
Amendment analysis.
In Chaplinsky v. New York,25 the Court began looking to a new
approach: categorization.26  The defendant in Chaplinsky was prose-
cuted under a state statute making it illegal to address someone offen-
sively such that the speech incites a breach of peace.27  The Court
identified “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem.”28  Among these it included “the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fight-
ing’ words.”29  It thus identified limited categories of content which
could be regulated without raising First Amendment concerns.  Be-
cause the statute’s construction confined the crime to fighting words,
which the Court identified as one of these categorical exceptions, the
law was constitutional.30
This categorization approach is a system of analysis in which
predefined categories of speech determine the level of constitutional
protection.31  This approach presumes all speech is protected from
content discrimination but identifies certain categories—for example,
obscenity or defamation—as narrow exceptions for which content dis-
20. See id. at 533.
21. See id. at 523.
22. See generally id.  Professor Rabban provides an excellent background on how a
number of scholars influenced the Court’s understanding of free speech, and
prompted Justice Holmes’s own transition toward a more libertarian view of the
First Amendment.
23. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
24. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1019 (In judging incitement, for which the
clear and present danger test was originally designed, “the Supreme Court has
used at least four major different approaches.”).
25. Chaplinsky v. New York, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26. See Werhan, supra note 4, at 54.
27. Id. at 573.
28. Id. at 571–72.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 573.
31. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493 n.44
(1975); Farber, supra note 4, at 917; Werhan, supra note 4, at 53.
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crimination is permitted.32  This analysis of speech-types on a whole-
sale basis requires the Court to define a category, which it does by
identifying the circumstances common to each variation of speech fit-
ting inside the intended category while ignoring facts irrelevant to the
category as a whole.33  Under this approach, a judge will allocate the
speech in question to its appropriate predefined category or will con-
clude that the speech does not fit within any category, and from this
its First Amendment protection necessarily follows.34  As Professor
Kathleen Sullivan notes, this method follows a taxonomist’s style by
requiring a judge to only classify and label the specific speech in accor-
dance with these categories, so that “all the important work in litiga-
tion is done at the outset.”35  Thus, because the Supreme Court has
shown some categories to receive harsher treatment than others, the
outcome of the case often depends on the judge’s classification of the
speech at issue.36
32. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 2, at 961.  It should also be noted here that the discussion of some speech as
“protected,” and other speech as “unprotected” is a simplistic generalization of
the Court’s complex First Amendment doctrine.  Whereas certain categories of
speech, such as fighting words and obscenity, are often referred to as “unpro-
tected,” they are not “speech entirely invisible to the Constitution.” R.A.V., 505
U.S. at 383.  Accordingly, a law cannot discriminate against speech within the
broader category of unprotected speech by, for example, banning only political
obscenity—while operating within the “unprotected” category of obscenity, such a
law unconstitutionally discriminates against a protected type of speech: political
speech.  Similarly, “protected” speech can, in some manners, be regulated.  A law
may, for example, regulate the “time, place and manner” of some speech, so long
as it does not discriminate against content.  To add more complexity, some
speech, such as commercial speech, enjoys more protection than “unprotected”
speech, but less protection than “protected” speech.  Thus, it is a spectrum of pro-
tection rather than a simple on-off switch, but for the sake of simplicity, discus-
sion will continue referring to speech as either “protected” or “unprotected.”  For
further discussion on the differences between these designations, see Farber,
supra note 4, at 925–31.
33. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 300–01 (1981) (“In formulating a categorical rule, we
isolate what we in our best judgment determine to be the facts on which we wish
and expect future cases to turn.  In doing so we suppose that these facts will recur
and that they will recur in substantially similar contexts.”).
34. See Ely, supra note 30, at 1493 n.44.  While the Court’s complicated and often
controversial treatment of content-discrimination is never so simple as this, the
Court does seem to rely on using categories and tiers of scrutiny to give govern-
ment more power to regulate certain content. See Farber, supra note 4, at
917–19.
35. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Bal-
ancing, 63 COLO. L. REV. 293, 293 (1992).
36. Id.  Courts also have a number of separate tools of analysis at their disposal such
as overbreadth and vagueness, which are each grounds for unconstitutionality
themselves.  Justice Alito, for example, employs vagueness in his concurrence in
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
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This is not meant to overstate the effect of categorization.  Classify-
ing certain speech as “protected” does not automatically mean the re-
striction is unconstitutional, but it does subject the statute to strict
scrutiny.37  Accordingly, should the government’s interest be suffi-
ciently compelling and the law be narrowly tailored to match this in-
terest, a law abridging protected speech can theoretically survive
constitutional analysis.38  But because strict scrutiny is so difficult to
overcome, the result of categorization will often suggest the
outcome.39
Though this approach has received both praise and criticism since
its appearance in Chaplinsky, the basic framework of discussing levels
of protection in terms of “types of speech” has persisted.40  First
Amendment analysis thus typically begins by determining whether
the speech at issue belongs to one of the unprotected categories.41
B. The Supreme Court’s Method of Formally Recognizing a
Category
1. Wholesale Balancing42—Recognizing Categories Before
Stevens
Over the past half-century, the Supreme Court has modified the
Chaplinsky list, giving formal recognition to a number of categories of
speech.43  While these recognition cases are few and far between,44
37. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994); Perry Educ. Ass’n v.
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2,
at 1017; Farber, supra note 4, at 919.
38. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
39. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 296. But see, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (finding the government’s limit on campaign con-
tributions was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, thus
surviving strict scrutiny).
40. See authorities in note 4.
41. See Farber, supra note 4, at 918; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of
the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (1960) (“In determining the consti-
tutionality of any ban on a communication, the first question is whether it be-
longs to a category that has any social utility.”).
42. The theory of categorization in which a category is recognized through wholesale
balancing has often been referred to as “definitional balancing.”  Norman T.
Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of
“Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining the “Visible
Boundaries of the First Amendment”, 39 AKRON L. REV. 483, 490 (2006).
43. Farber, supra note 4, at 917.
44. While some other cases arguably added categories such as fraud, commercial
speech, or true threats, these opinions tend to give little indication as to how the
Court decided to include their categories.  The opinions I discuss in this Part are
ones in which the Court clearly gave justification of its recognition of the
category.
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they provide valuable primary evidence of how the Court goes about
recognizing a category.45
In Chaplinsky itself the Court seemed to justify the categorical ex-
ceptions primarily through a balancing test, noting simply that the
benefit of each such category is de minimis next to the cost.46  The
Court also noted that regulation of these categories has “never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problems”47 while adding a fur-
ther justification: excluding these categories merely extended
tradition.
In Roth v. United States,48 the Court examined whether “obscen-
ity” truly belonged as one of these categories49 by addressing the con-
stitutionality of a law criminalizing certain publication and
dissemination of obscenity.50  The Court’s analysis began by recogniz-
45. This Note discusses “recognition” of a category, rather than “creation” of one.
While the Supreme Court may sometimes seem to create entirely new categories,
the Court, in United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), was determined to
avoid the idea of category genesis, instead terming its actions as “recognition”:
Our decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as establishing
a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the
scope of the First Amendment.  Maybe there are some categories of
speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been spe-
cifically identified or discussed as such in our case law . . . . We need not
foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories to reject the
Government’s highly manipulable balancing test as a means of identify-
ing them.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (emphasis added).  The Court explained its past ac-
tions as merely recognizing preexisting but undeclared categories.  Although this
may be true, it is certainly debatable.  Instead of engaging in this discussion,
however, I wrestle with the closely related issue of the manner in which the Court
justifies a categorical exception in the first place.  One of the categories I discuss
in this section of the background was clearly pre-existent yet unrecognized,
whereas the others had a less evident history.  In all such cases, however, the
Court must choose whether to recognize a category, regardless of whether it si-
multaneously “creates” a new category. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957), for example, was not the first case discussing an exception for “obscen-
ity”—obscenity had been excepted for decades beforehand—but it involved the
Court’s first decided attempt to justify the category. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982), on the other hand, dealt with the relatively new problem of child por-
nography, arguably creating a category simultaneous to recognizing it.  Whereas
one might argue that the court “created” a category in the latter case, it clearly
does not in the former, in which the category of obscenity had long been infor-
mally recognized.  But in both cases the Court gave formal weight to each cate-
gory through their justification. See Kalven supra note 40, at 2.  Thus, I use the
term “recognition” as a relatively neutral term applicable to any case in which the
Court seriously discusses the justification behind a category’s exception.
46. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
47. Id. at 571–72.
48. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
49. See Farber, supra note 4, at 921 (“The only question was whether obscenity in
general is ‘utterance within the area of protected speech and press.’”).
50. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
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ing that many states at the time of the Constitution’s ratification rec-
ognized less-than-full speech protection for obscenity or for the related
acts of profanity or blasphemy.51  Further, the Court reasoned such
speech was “utterly without redeeming social importance”52 and noted
that current obscenity laws of numerous nations and states affirm this
value judgment.53  From these reasons the Court found obscenity con-
stitutionally unprotected.54  Again though, the Court failed to give a
specific test for how to recognize a category.
In New York v. Ferber55 the Court addressed whether to recognize
an exception for child pornography.56  Here the Court directly con-
fronted the issue57 by recognizing a category and identifying a number
of justifications for doing so.  First, the Court reasoned that the mar-
ket for child pornography provided incentive for sexual child abuse,
creating an intrinsic relationship between the expression and crime.58
Such a relationship easily led the Court to a compelling government
interest in restricting the expression itself.59  The Court also added
that “[i]t rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”60  Fi-
nally, the Court also found that when balanced against the costs child
pornography is of de minimis value.61
Though useful, these cases fail to show a consistent approach with
each giving multiple reasons for their categorical exclusion while fail-
ing to explicitly identify a single method or standard by which to judge
a potential category for official recognition.  In an attempt to resolve
this problem, many scholars at the time seized upon the recurrent fo-
cus on cost-benefit analysis, finding the Court’s language to reveal
some form of wholesale balancing as the primary inquiry behind cate-
gorization.62  Under such a test a court would examine the proposed
51. Id. at 482.
52. Id. at 484.
53. Id. at 484–85.
54. Id. at 485.
55. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
56. Id. at 753.
57. Id. at 753.
58. Id. at 759.
59. Id. at 756–61.
60. Id. at 761–62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 762–64.
62. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1017 (“[C]ategories . . . reflect value judg-
ments by the Supreme Court.”); Deutsch, supra note 41, at 528 (viewing the
Court as implicitly applying definitional balancing across its opinions); Sullivan,
supra note 34, at 295 n.6, 308 (referring to categorization and balancing as “really
the same job.”); Werhan, supra note 4, at 53, 56 (seeing Chaplinsky as using “cat-
egorical cost-benefit balancing”).  But see Farber, supra note 4, at 920 (seeing it
not quite as cost-benefit balancing, but a prepackaged satisfaction of strict scru-
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category as a whole to make a blanket assertion of either protection or
exclusion for the entire type of speech.63  Next, a court would balance
competing interests for the speech at issue, and should the costs of the
speech clearly outweigh the benefits, a First Amendment exception for
the entire type of speech should result.64  Despite a fairly general
agreement that a balancing test was the Court’s prominent method for
recognizing categories, other justifications also underlay the Court’s
decisions.  These alternatives surfaced in United States v. Stevens65 to
clearly establish a different method of recognizing categories.
2. United States v. Stevens Declares a Test: Historical
Treatment
The Supreme Court in Stevens dismissed the balancing approach
as far too discretionary.66 Stevens involved a federal statute criminal-
izing the sale, purchase, or commercial production of animal cruelty.67
The government attempted to persuade the Court to add a category to
the list of First Amendment exceptions by advocating that the Court
view “[commercial] depictions of animal cruelty” through the lens of a
balancing test—weighing its social benefit to its cost.68  The Court rec-
ognized that previous cases seemed to indicate that a category could
be justified where the speech’s cost outweighs its benefits, but it then
asserted that its past opinions had never actually identified categories
on the basis of balancing.  Instead, it claimed to have merely described
historically excluded categories as valueless.69  The Court reasoned
that the Constitution forbids any value judgment of speech, finding
such a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . startling
and dangerous.”70
tiny); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297,
298 (1995) (arguing the Court has at least sometimes based categories on
speech’s “low value”).
63. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 771 (17th
ed. 2010) (explaining the application of wholesale balancing); Deutsch, supra note
41, at 491 (same); Schauer, supra note 32, at 300 (discussing categorization in
general); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Essay: Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and
Reality, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 162 (1994) (“In a categorical balancing situation,
since categories are being used, the balancing focuses on the general category
rather than on the particular instance involved in the case.”).
64. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 (1992) (White, J., concurring); Deutsch,
supra note 41, at 494–95; Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the
Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 647, 671 (2002); Werhan, supra note 4, at 54.
65. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
66. Id. at 1586.
67. Id. at 1582–83.
68. Id. at 1585.
69. Id. at 1586.
70. Id. at 1585.
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Rather than accept this “highly manipulable balancing test,”71 the
Court preferred a historical analysis in which it examined whether
that type of speech had a long-established tradition of Constitutional
exclusion.72  Under this approach, the Court chose to avoid relying on
judicial discretion, instead trusting the test of time to filter the catego-
ries truly belonging outside the First Amendment.  But this does not
necessarily stop the list of categories from expanding.  Speech not yet
formally recognized as an exception may still find a place on the list
even if it has flown under the judicial radar so long as a history of
permitted restrictions exists.73  With no such historical pedigree of
regulation, “depictions of animal cruelty” were constitutionally
protected.74
Thus, the Court reinforced the categorization method as putting
formal boundaries on historical limits of free speech and rejecting ad
hoc or wholesale balancing analysis as a means adding new categories
to the list.75
C. Variable Definitions of Obscenity: The Ginsberg
Approach
This Note’s discussion so far has addressed “regular” First Amend-
ment analysis, but when restrictions target speech toward children,
the protection can change.  Generally, children enjoy lesser constitu-
tional protection,76 which includes, in some instances, a diminished
protection of free speech rights.77  This is perhaps most clearly shown
in the decision Ginsberg v. New York,78 in which the Supreme Court
examined a conviction for selling minors “girlie” magazines.79  Though
girlie magazines were clearly outside the category of “obscenity,” the
government contended that for minors regulation was still appropri-
ate.80  In response, the Court noted that, so long as the government’s
justification was “rational,” girlie magazines could sometimes be in-
cluded in the definition of “obscenity” which would thereby permit re-
striction.81  The statute, the Court reasoned, helped enforce parental
authority by better enabling parents to properly raise their children.82
Further, New York case law and legislative findings both indicated
71. Id. at 1586.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; accord Strossen, supra note 1, at 104.
76. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
77. See authorities cited in note 7.
78. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
79. Id. at 631.
80. Id. at 634, 639.
81. Id. at 639, 641.
82. Id. at 639.
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sexual material is harmful to children, leading the Court to also find a
state interest in protecting children from such material.83  Accord-
ingly, the Court found the government’s reasoning “not irrational” and
expanded obscenity’s definition to account for children as recipients.84
Under this rationale, the Court followed the lead of the New York
Court of Appeals and permitted a variable definition of “obscenity.”85
This expanded the definition of obscenity when children were the re-
cipients to include more forms of speech than usual.  The Court ex-
plained that it “adjust[ed] the definition of obscenity ‘to the social
realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be as-
sessed in terms of the sexual interests . . .’ of such minors.”86
The Court acquired this variable approach from an article by
professors William Lockhart and Robert McClure,87 in which the au-
thors wrestled with the notoriously difficult meaning of “obscenity.”88
They addressed the issue by examining whether some static and inert
trait put the “obscene” in obscenity or whether it was instead a
“chameleonic quality . . . that changes with time, place, and circum-
stance.”89  The article noted several circumstances, such as children
as speech recipients, which would benefit from viewing obscenity
through this second option, as something variable.90  By accounting
for the circumstances surrounding the speech, this variable definition
relies on a judge’s discretion to determine whether the speech in ques-
tion is, in the judge’s opinion, obscene.91  Such a solution hearkens
back to Justice Stewart’s answer to the same problem, allowing judges
to know it when they see it.92  By using this definition in Ginsberg, the
Court found the involvement of minors to transform some tradition-
ally non-obscene speech into something circumstantially “obscene.”
D. The First Amendment and Speech Toward Children
Involvement of minors will thus distort First Amendment analysis.
Though the extent and manner of this distortion is imprecise, the
Court has addressed a few First Amendment cases involving children
recipients that shed some light on the issue.
83. Id. at 640–42.
84. Id. at 642–43.
85. Id. at 635–36.
86. Id. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. State of New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)).
87. William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Develop-
ing Constitutional Standards, 5 MINN. L. REV. 45 (1960).
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id. at 68.
90. See generally id. at 77–84.
91. Id. at 77.
92. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), Justice
Potter Stewart famously struggled pinning down a definition for “hard-core por-
nography,” concluding simply, “I know it when I see it.”
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1. Media Restrictions of Profanity
In FCC v. Pacifica,93 the Court considered a complaint issued by
the FCC against a radio station for airing offensive language in an
afternoon broadcast.94  The broadcast was a monologue titled “Filthy
Words” which, though aptly named, contained nothing fitting the defi-
nition of “obscene.”95  Although indecent language was not itself an
unprotected category, the Court analogized the language to obscenity
to show that, as with variable obscenity, the circumstances could
sometimes place such profanity outside the First Amendment.96
In doing so, the Court identified a number of particular factors be-
hind this decision.  First, the monologue was broadcast in early after-
noon, a time at which children were likely in the audience.97  Second,
broadcast media has a unique pervasiveness, a quality that allows it
to invade a home without always warning listeners of impending un-
welcome content.98  This also led both the Court and government to
liken such speech to the legal concept of nuisance.99  Third, the Court
analogized the case to Ginsberg; the ease with which children can ac-
cess radio broadcasts amplified the concerns of protecting children
and justified taking the particular circumstances into account.100  Af-
ter all, even children too young to read could access broadcast media
on their own.101  All of these justifications in combination made the
speech unprotected.102  However, the Court was also careful to em-
phasize the narrowness of its holding, noting that each of the factors
were integral to the holding’s justification.103  After combining these
circumstances with the nuisance of broadcast profanity and the con-
cerns in Ginsberg the Court found the restriction constitutional.104
Pacifica-like arguments also appear in a number of later cases.
Since that decision, the Court has addressed attempts to regulate un-
solicited mailing of contraceptive ads,105 pre-recorded pornographic
telephone messages,106 indecent Internet content,107 and cable televi-
sion.108  Each of these opinions involved attempts to protect children
93. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
94. Id. at 730.
95. Id. at 729.
96. Id. at 745–48.
97. Id. at 732, 750.
98. Id. at 748.
99. Id. at 750–51.
100. Id. at 749–50.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 750–51.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
106. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
107. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
108. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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from “inappropriate” but non-obscene expression, yet, despite such
similarities, the Court distinguished Pacifica in each case.109  Inde-
cent mailings, for example, can be easily monitored, whereas a sudden
radio expletive can easily surprise a listener.110  Similarly, “dial-a-
porn” phone services are unlike broadcasting because the speech re-
cipient must actively seek indecency.111  The Court has thus resisted
extending the regulation of profanity past the narrow circumstances
of Pacifica and unique qualities of broadcasting.
2. Significant Protection for Minors
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,112 the Court again addressed
the issue of children speech recipients when it considered the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance criminalizing any nudity at a drive-in theater
visible from a public street.113  Although simple nudity falls outside
the standard view of obscenity,114 the government supported the law
as a means of protecting children from the images.115  The Court ac-
knowledged some additional leeway for protecting children but added
they are nonetheless “entitled to a significant measure of First
Amendment protection” and merit different treatment only in narrow
and well-defined circumstances.116  This means the First Amendment
almost fully protects speech toward minors, prohibiting governments
from simply determining material “unsuitable” for them.117  In this
sense the Court emphasized that “[i]n most circumstances, the values
protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when govern-
ment seeks to control the flow of information to minors.”118  Thus,
even with an expanded definition of obscenity, the prohibition of all
nudity was unconstitutional.
109. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 815; Reno, 521 U.S. at 866–67; Sable, 492 U.S.
at 127–28; Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1071
(“The Court . . . has not been willing to extend Pacifica beyond the over-the-air—
free—broadcast media.  In cases involving telephones, cable television, and the
Internet, the Court has largely rejected Pacifica and has struck down federal reg-
ulations of ‘indecent’ speech.”).
110. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74.
111. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127–28.
112. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
113. Id. at 206.
114. Id. at 208.
115. Id. at 212.
116. Id. at 212–13.
117. Id. at 213–14 (“Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some
other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”).
118. Id. at 214.
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E. Recognizing Categories Involving Speech Toward
Children: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n
1. Procedural History
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,119 the Supreme Court
encountered for the first time the distorting effect of speech toward
children coupled with regulating speech in a yet unrecognized cate-
gory.  In 2005, California enacted a statute prohibiting the sale or
rental of any ultraviolent video games to minors.120  The statute pro-
hibited certain violent acts done in a way that “[a] reasonable person,
considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or
morbid interest of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors,” and
that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors.”121
The Entertainment Merchants Association quickly filed suit
against a number of state officials.122  The district judge found strict
scrutiny applicable.123  Under that standard, the judge found insuffi-
cient evidence that violent video games actually cause violent behav-
ior or that they significantly differ from other media, which ultimately
led the judge to declare the law unconstitutional.124
The Ninth Circuit upheld this decision, also finding the law subject
to strict scrutiny rather than the “ ‘variable obscenity’ standard” in
Ginsberg.125  The circuit court found the Ginsberg rationale particular
to obscenity, which includes only sexual speech.126  Because violent
speech is not part of any categorical exception, the court employed
strict scrutiny.127  As would be expected under strict scrutiny, the
statute failed to survive this examination, as the court found insuffi-
cient evidence to support a compelling government interest.128  Cali-
fornia, however, continued litigation by successfully petitioning the
Supreme Court for certiorari.129
119. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
120. Id. at 2732.  This statute is codified in the California Code as CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2009).
121. Id. at 2732–33.
122. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
123. Id. at *24.
124. Id. at *30.
125. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.
2009).
126. Id. at 960–61.
127. Id. at 957.
128. Id. at 964.
129. Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010).
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2. The Majority’s Decision
The Supreme Court voted 7-2 to affirm the unconstitutionality of
the California law.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, declared
video games to be speech within the First Amendment130 and moved
to the first issue—the level of protection for violent speech toward
children.131  For this question the majority found the holding of
United States v. Stevens controlling, which required any exception
from First Amendment protection to have a long tradition of exemp-
tion reflecting a “judgment of the American people” throughout his-
tory.132  By recognizing violent speech as clearly outside the obscenity
exception, the Court found this law to be California’s attempt to estab-
lish an entirely separate category.133
The majority pressed this distinction to find the Ginsberg decision
inapplicable as relating to obscenity rather than violence, despite the
fact that California had modeled its statute after the law in Gins-
berg.134  The majority further distinguished the two cases by noting
that California’s attempt to establish a whole category was entirely
different from the mere adjustment of category boundaries in Gins-
berg.135  Reaffirming children’s significant First Amendment rights,
the majority went on to discuss the historical precedent for regulation
of violent speech toward children.136  After finding insufficient tradi-
tional premise for such a category, the Court applied strict scru-
tiny.137  Unsurprisingly, the State’s evidence was insufficient to pass
such scrutiny, leading the Court to declare the law
unconstitutional.138
3. Justice Alito’s Concurrence139
Justice Alito took a different approach.  Instead of walking through
a full analysis of the majority opinion, Justice Alito found the statute
130. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
131. Id. at 2733–34.  The discussion of Stevens and categorization makes it evident
that the Court is first addressing the level of protection for the speech at issue.
132. Id. at 2734.
133. Id. at 2734–35.
134. Id. at 2735.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2735–36.
137. Id. at 2736 (“California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding
tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of
violence, but there is none.”).
138. Id. at 2738.
139. Although this Note does not go into detail on the dissents, Justices Breyer and
Thomas each wrote dissenting opinions.  Justice Thomas focused on views
expressed by the Framers to argue for the category of “speech to minor children
bypassing their parents.” Id. at 2752 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer,
however, runs the statute through both vagueness, as used by Justice Alito, and
strict scrutiny, as used by the majority, finding both tests to be satisfied. Id. at
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unconstitutionally vague.140  He noted that the California statute was
clearly modeled after the one in Ginsberg but that it lacked a clear
description of violence.141  By using vagueness to strike down the stat-
ute Justice Alito avoided a full analysis of the regulability of violent
speech toward children but still spent some time critiquing the major-
ity’s approach.142
Justice Alito’s criticisms were generally that the majority went too
far.  He accused the majority of overstating its protection of children
by applying too strict a standard.143  He also faulted the majority for
creating a “sweeping” opinion which gives strong protection to ques-
tionable material.144  He further commented that the majority quickly
equated video games to other forms of expression while ignoring po-
tential differences from video, radio, and literature.145
Justice Alito’s major categorization-related criticism was the ma-
jority’s use of Stevens to determine First Amendment protection.146
He attacked the majority’s choice on a number of points, noting Ste-
vens broadly prohibited creating, selling, or possessing the expression
and was directed at everyone.147  To him, this created a meaningful
distinction from the California statute, which prohibited only the
purchase or rental of the game to minors.148  He also attacked the
Court’s decision to use strict scrutiny from Stevens, rather than the
“more lenient standard applied in Ginsberg.”149  Through these re-
marks, Justice Alito suggested Ginsberg as the more appropriate mea-
sure of protection for the California statute, recognizing that the
statutes in both cases contained similar prohibited acts and focused
specifically on speech toward children.
Further, although the majority expressed a fear of creating a “free-
floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be ex-
posed,”150 Justice Alito argued that such a law merely reinforces pa-
rental authority by allowing them the ability to override the law and
provide their children with these prohibited games.151  Thus, should
2765, 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Breyer also made an interesting point about
the majority’s categorization, finding that the speech in question was not
“depictions of violence,” but “protection of children.” Id. at 2762.
140. Id. at 2742–43 (Alito, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 2744–46.
142. Id. at 2746.
143. Id. at 2747.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2748.
146. Id. at 2747.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2736 (majority opinion).
151. Id. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring).
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the statute have been sufficiently narrow to pass vagueness analysis,
Justice Alito indicated a government-favorable analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
Until Entertainment Merchants, the Court had never addressed
whether violent speech received by children claimed a spot on the list
of First Amendment exceptions.  Thus, the majority’s first issue was
simply whether such speech merits protection.152  As such, this
framed one of the points of dispute between Justice Scalia’s majority
and Justice Alito’s concurrence, revolving around the simple choice
and application of precedent.  Where the majority chose to use Ste-
vens, Justice Alito argued Ginsberg was Entertainment Merchants’s
“most closely related precedent.”153
The majority approached the issue by adhering to its existing juris-
prudence for new speech categories, applying the clear holding of Ste-
vens to determine whether to recognize a new exception.154  In so
doing, the majority quickly discounted Ginsberg as inapplicable for
such analysis.155  Meanwhile, however, its opinion failed to fully ad-
dress the issues raised by Justice Alito, who disapproved of the use of
Stevens and indicated that Ginsberg provided the proper standard for
speech toward children.156
In the end, both the majority and Justice Alito’s concurrence put
forth different cases as controlling, but neither opinion fully accounts
for its choice.  The implications, however, are potentially significant
shifts in the scheme of free speech protection.  The following analysis
examines the underlying doctrine of this disagreement by asking
whether Ginsberg could serve as an effective replacement for Stevens
and whether such a replacement could fit with the remainder of ex-
isting First Amendment jurisprudence.  In the end, this Note shows
that the majority (despite its relative brevity) was correct, in the con-
text of existing First Amendment jurisprudence, not to extend Gins-
berg to this potential application.
Section A argues the approach used in Ginsberg was off-point be-
cause it was a device used for defining rather than recognizing a cate-
gory, but that it might still apply by analogy.  Section B discusses this
possible analogy by examining the likely application of Ginsberg as
Justice Alito sees it, which seems to drastically depart from “stan-
dard” free speech jurisprudence by employing a rational basis test for
determining protection.  Section C examines the Court’s past treat-
152. Id. at 2733–34.
153. Id. at 2747.
154. Id. at 2734 (majority opinion).
155. Id. at 2735–36.
156. Id. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring).
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ment of speech toward children, concluding that application of the
First Amendment in these cases is not so unique as to justify such a
drastic departure.
A. Ginsberg Is Off-Point for Recognizing a Category
Before addressing Justice Alito’s specific modification of the major-
ity approach, it is first necessary to address whether Ginsberg is even
applicable as direct authority for categorization in Entertainment
Merchants.  The Ginsberg approach dealt with objectionable speech
and its application toward children, similar to the law in Entertain-
ment Merchants, but the legal issues involved were distinct.
1. Ginsberg Does Not Discuss Whether to Recognize a Category
but Rather How to Define One
Creating a proper definition for obscenity has provided courts with
a particular challenge.157  While obscenity is sexual, there is also
something to it that shocks and offends beyond mere sexual expres-
sion.158  Since offense cannot justify speech restrictions, this “some-
thing more” is what thrusts simple sexual expression beyond the
limits of social acceptance and constitutional protection.159  Although
obscenity was one of the first categories,160 it was notoriously difficult
to properly define so as to accurately capture this elusive quality.161
This difficulty was in part because the “obscene” quality seemed to
manifest many different forms, depending on the time, place and cir-
cumstances of the speech.162  That is, a sexual remark regularly spo-
ken in a seedy bar might simply be unthinkable at a formal banquet.
The variable approach deals with this amorphous aspect by basing
the boundaries of obscenity partly on the context itself.163  Rather
than defining the term in a vacuum to rigidly apply regardless of cir-
cumstances or effect, variable obscenity defines the category as “ob-
scene for its time, place, and circumstances” so judges might
157. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37–39 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); CHEMERIN-
SKY, supra note 2, at 1052; Shaman, supra note 61, at 302.
158. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 n.2; id. at 40–41 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Rosenfeld v.
New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 909 (1972); Lockhart & McClure, supra note 86, at 66.
159. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 n.2; id. at 40–41 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Rosenfeld,
408 U.S. at 909; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 86, at 66.
160. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
161. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 37–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1052.
162. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 40–41 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring in part).  The language “time,
place, and circumstance” appears in professors Lockhart and McClure’s discus-
sion on the issue.  Lockhart & McClure, supra note 86, at 68.
163. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 81, at 68.
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accurately differentiate, for any given setting, the truly obscene from
the appropriately sexual.164  It is thus a definitional tool, putting a
flexible boundary on an existing category.165
Following this reasoning, the Court in Ginsberg used the variable
definition for the previously recognized category of obscenity, thereby
using it only for the scope of that category’s application.166  Accord-
ingly, after choosing to employ the variable definition, the Court’s dis-
cussion simply worked to expand the definition for children, focusing
on the justifications for using “children recipients” as a relevant cir-
cumstance.167  Under this reasoning, the Court simply enabled ob-
scenity’s definition to take the audience into account, allowing for a
slightly broader First Amendment exception for child recipients.  In
this way the Court addressed the questions of how to determine the
scope of the existing exception and the relevance of children as a fac-
tor, but it never addressed whether to identify another category of
speech.  Indeed, the Court itself recognized that it merely adjusted the
definition to account for children.168  Thus, the holding in Ginsberg
pertains to definition rather than addressing a recognition question
like the one in Entertainment Merchants.
164. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 81, at 77.
165. Consequently, the Court also adapted similar reasoning for its own general defi-
nition of “obscenity” several years after Ginsberg, in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), by basing its definition on the offensiveness to “the average person,
applying contemporary community standards.” Id. at 24.  This, to some extent,
also takes circumstances into account by judging obscenity based on the period
and community of its utterance.
166. Although a direct use of the approach in Ginsberg is off-point, one might, as Jus-
tice Alito seems to suggest, use the reasoning and standard behind the decision
as a separate test for determining First Amendment protection.  This is discussed
at greater length in section III.B.
167. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (adjusting the definition of ob-
scenity by assessing the speech “ ‘in terms of the sexual interests . . .’ of such mi-
nors.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 86, at 85 (“[V]ariable obscenity focuses attention upon the make-up of pri-
mary and peripheral audiences in varying circumstances, and provides a reason-
ably satisfactory means for delineating the obscene in each circumstance.”).
168. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509
(1966) (“We do not regard New York’s regulation . . . as involving an invasion of
such minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms.  Rather [it] simply adjusts the
definition of obscenity ‘to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of
material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests . . .’ of such minors.”)
(emphasis added)).  The majority in Entertainment Merchants recognized this
point, stating that Ginsberg is inapplicable because it merely expands the defini-
tion, but does not create an entirely new category.  Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n,
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011).  But while the majority was correct in this assertion,
it never addressed the further possibility of analogizing the two cases.
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2. Defining a Category Is Distinct from Recognizing One
Although the issues of definition and recognition are related, they
are conceptually distinct.  Definition is the identification of the quality
or set of qualities that, whenever present and regardless of additional
circumstances, necessarily merits no First Amendment protection.169
With fighting words, for example, a necessary quality is the tendency
of actual provocation.170  This potential for a provoked response dis-
tinguishes the speech from mere insults, meaning that an effective
definition could not simply be “any insulting or abusive language” but
instead must be “any insulting or abusive language with the tendency
to incite violence against the speaker.”171  Because these qualities es-
tablish the speech as outside First Amendment protection, their iden-
tification in the definition is necessary to give the category proper
scope.172  The goal of a definition, thus, is accuracy—to describe the
category containing the correct qualities which differentiate it from
speech deserving First Amendment protection.
The different methods of recognizing categories discussed in sec-
tion II.B, on the other hand, examine the societal impact or views of
speech, making a determination one way or the other as to whether a
whole type of speech is protected.  The method in Stevens, for example,
looks to the history of First Amendment treatment for that type of
speech,173 while wholesale balancing looks to the opposing costs and
interests involved.174  Both methods exist, however, to determine the
constitutional protection to attribute.  The goal then is propriety—to
determine what level of protection is appropriate for the speech in
question.
An important distinction therefore exists between questions of rec-
ognition and definition.175  Although the issues may lean on one an-
other to make categorization effective, they effect separate goals:
169. See Schauer, supra note 32, and accompanying text.
170. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1972).
171. See generally Gooding, 405 U.S. 518 (showing risk of incitement to be a necessary
element).
172. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1018 (“[T]he categorical approach requires
careful attention to how the types of unprotected speech are defined . . . . [T]hey
determine whether the government can punish the speech or whether the expres-
sion is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”); Schauer supra note 32, at
300–01.
173. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
174. See authorities supra note 62–63, and accompanying text.
175. See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 936
(2001) (describing how when the Court “eliminates” a category from protection it
will typically also carefully define the speech that can be banned, but noting also
that the Court has eliminated a category without attempting to define it); Farber,
supra note 4, at 925 (noting that Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) repre-
sents both the Court’s “official recognition of true threats as unprotected” and “its
first definition of the category’s boundaries”).
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definition determines how to distinguish between the types of speech,
whereas recognition focuses simply on whether to protect such speech.
Consequently, the definitional issues presented in Ginsberg show
themselves to be off-point for the recognition issues in Entertainment
Merchants.
3. The Similarities in Ginsberg May Still Provide a Test by
Analogy
That being said, there are some undeniable similarities between
the holding in Ginsberg and the act of recognizing a category.  They
appear not in the issue or holding, but in the effect of the Ginsberg
analysis.  By using the variable approach, the Court expanded the def-
inition, including an area of speech on the periphery of “obscenity”
which under a traditional definition would have received full First
Amendment protection.176  By carving out this “obscene for minors”
sliver of speech, the Court effectively designated additional speech as
“unprotected,” similar to the act of recognizing a category in Ferber or
Roth.177  Thus, while the distinction between the issues in the two
cases prevents Ginsberg from being directly applicable as a standard
for adding categories, it did create an effect similar to adding a cate-
gory to the list.  This similarity may not be on point, but it suggests an
application by analogy, a method of analysis to which Justice Alito
may have to subscribed.
B. Replacing Stevens with Ginsberg Would Drastically
Change First Amendment Analysis
Because it is clear that the reasoning in Ginsberg does not serve as
direct precedent for recognizing categories (but does address a related
question), it must then be determined what purpose this precedent
can serve.  Justice Alito’s concurrence adds little input to this effect.
While he emphatically rejected Stevens, he failed to demonstrate how
the latter operates as a method of recognizing First Amendment pro-
tection.178  Thus, it is necessary to parse his language and the reason-
ing of the Ginsberg court to determine its likely application.
1. Ginsberg as a Rationality Threshold for Categorization
The justifications put forth in Ginsberg were the governmental and
parental interests in preventing the exposure of children to near-ob-
scene speech.179  The Court repeatedly suggested that these interests
176. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634–35 (1968).
177. See discussion supra in section II.B (discussing both cases).
178. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2747 (2011) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
179. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639–40 (1968).
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in protecting children must be “at least rational,”180 which suggests
Ginsberg used something akin to rational basis scrutiny as the thresh-
old for expanding the category for minors.  From this we might reason-
ably conclude that employing Ginsberg in Entertainment Merchants
would similarly require a rational basis test as the standard for recog-
nizing categories.  Indeed, Justice Alito suggested the “more lenient
standard” in Ginsberg, indicating the possibility that a rational basis
test would guard the threshold to placing a category of speech with a
child audience outside the full First Amendment protection.181  This
makes sense as the most likely application of Ginsberg’s lenient stan-
dard—just as the Ginsberg required rationality to expand the defini-
tion obscenity for minors, it would require rationality to create a
category of speech toward children.
While a rational basis test could operate as a threshold for recog-
nizing categories, there is still a question as to whether it deserves a
place in First Amendment jurisprudence.  Balancing, to some extent,
still exists in First Amendment analysis,182 but such a rational basis
test would be a drastic change for the established method of analyzing
content discrimination.
First, it would put the speech recipient, children, as the primary
focus rather than the type of speech itself.  Instead of examining con-
tent it would look to government interests, allowing any restriction
promoting a rational interest.  This test is, however, a far cry from the
approach clearly adopted in Stevens, at least for speech toward adults,
in which categories are justified by a tradition of exemption.
Additionally, because this test merely requires the government to
act rationally, all but the most arbitrary restrictions are constitu-
tional.183  With this lenient standard the First Amendment would pro-
vide little more than nominal protection.184  Indeed, the rational basis
test carries a strong presumption in favor of the government’s discre-
tion.185  But the Court addressed governmental discretion in Stevens;
it rejected the concept of a legislature restricting speech it deemed
“valueless” or “costly,” instead giving strong protection to traditional
180. Id. at 639, 641, 643.
181. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring).
182. See Schauer, supra note 32, at 299 (arguing neither categorization nor balancing
can be entirely eliminated from the analysis).  Even in eliminating wholesale bal-
ancing, the protection provided by strict scrutiny does involve some balancing—
although, admittedly, this balance assumes a heavy thumb on the side of the
right-holder—when it examines the compelling interest.
183. See Neelum J. Wadhwani, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV.
801, 802 (2006).
184. See id. at 801 (“Our jurisprudence displays a remarkably nominal fealty to ra-
tional basis review, leaving it little more than a hollow test.”).
185. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 296.
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free speech rights.186  Moreover, the Court has directly opposed a pre-
sumption in favor of content restriction by showing such restrictions
to strike at the heart of First Amendment protection.187  Such a test
would thus largely circumvent one of the Court’s most closely guarded
speech protections.
Further, a rational basis test would nearly eliminate the Court’s
current concept of categorization altogether.  Under that standard,
legislatures would have broad power to create any content-discrimina-
tory restriction founded on a rational fear, thereby establishing a
scheme in which exceptions could swallow the rule.  Rather than hav-
ing “narrowly defined” exceptions to the presumption against speech
restrictions, the First Amendment would have a presumption favoring
restrictions, using strict scrutiny to protect only those few areas of
speech for which regulation is utterly irrational.188  It can almost go
unsaid that a doctrine is objectionable which uses strict scrutiny for
the sole purpose of guarding against regulations that could not even
pass rational basis scrutiny.
But aside from raising logical difficulties of its own, there is also
the difficulty of reconciling such a test for recognizing categories with
the method established in Stevens.  As shown, a rational basis test for
recognizing categories would clearly be different in kind from the one
established in Stevens.  It would create a government-weighted stan-
dard as well as greatly expand the scope of regulable speech.  Consid-
ering the important differences from the Court’s general treatment of
speech regulation, the question then becomes whether such a pro-
nounced exception for speech toward children really can find warrant
in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  Likely it cannot.
2. An Alternative Application?
Before discussing the Court’s past treatment of speech toward chil-
dren, it is important also to note the possibility that Justice Alito
might have sought to put Ginsberg in a somewhat different role.
Justice Alito elaborated little on his use of Ginsberg, but he did
make a number of comparisons that help explain its designation as
the “most closely related precedent.”189  At the outset, Justice Alito
recognized the California legislature modeled its definition of violence
186. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
187. See Strossen, supra note 1, at 67, 77 (“[T]he Court has consistently held that
content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional.”).
188. Also of note is the quizzical situation resulting from using strict scrutiny for pro-
tected speech and a rational basis test to recognize categories.  It would require a
compelling government interest for one specific legislative restriction to survive,
but merely a rational one to create an entire categorical exception.
189. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2747 (2011) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
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on the definition of obscenity in Ginsberg.190  Additionally, the stat-
utes both regulate similar activities and recipients—the sale of speech
to minors.  On this point too, Justice Alito found Ginsberg more rele-
vant.191  He also defended the California statute, arguing that, like
the statute in Ginsberg, it merely reinforced parental authority by giv-
ing parents themselves the ability to buy these games for their chil-
dren.192  In these comparisons to Ginsberg, however, Justice Alito
never discussed the differences between obscenity and violent speech
or how the type of speech might affect protection.193
As demonstrated in subsection III.A.2, the category recognition
process involves the singling out and analysis of certain speech.
Whether under the historical analysis adopted in Stevens or the bal-
ancing approach rejected in that same case, recognizing a category is a
question of general applicability for all situations involving speech of
that type.194  The focus is to provide protection specific to that con-
tent.195  Yet Justice Alito’s comparisons said nothing about the type of
speech itself.  Instead of comparing Ginsberg to analyze violent ex-
pression, he seemed to simply equate the two types of speech and turn
his attention to other points of similarity.  By focusing on other simi-
larities, he gave no arguments attempting to justify a lasting category
of speech useable by later courts for taxonomic “classification” and “la-
beling.”  More than anything, his reasoning appeared to simply ignore
traditional notions of categorization, placing the speech recipient
rather than the type of speech as the primary concern.
In addition to suggesting Ginsberg as a replacement test for recog-
nizing a category, these comparisons could also be read as replacing
the entire system of categorization and installing a rational basis test
as the sole mechanism of protecting speech with a child audience.
This, based on the sole fact that the audience comprises of children,
would question only the rationality of the speech restriction without
regard to speech categories.  But such a use of Ginsberg is difficult to
justify.  First, it is impossible here to make the analogical connection
to Ginsberg discussed in subsection III.A.3.  That analogy relied on the
similarity between the expansion of a category’s definition and the
creation of a new category—it is a much different thing to analogize
the expansion of the category to abolition of categorization and in-
190. Id. at 2743.
191. Id. at 2747.
192. Id.
193. Justice Alito makes clear his distaste for the violence in question. Id. at 2749–50.
He does not, however, analyze the speech for First Amendment protection, but
merely uses this disgust to emphasize the differences between video games and
other media. Id. at 2750.  And as the majority correctly points out, “disgust is not
a valid basis for restricting expression.” Id. at 2738 (majority opinion).
194. See authorities supra note 62.
195. See authorities supra notes 30–33, and accompanying text.
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statement of a rational basis standard.  Second, as noted above, using
rationality as a threshold for recognizing a formal category allows the
exceptions to swallow the rule, enabling the rational basis test to ef-
fectively replace categorization altogether.196  This is essentially the
same result as replacing the entire categorization method with a sin-
gle rational basis test.  With effectively the same result, both applica-
tions of Ginsberg are subject to the same criticisms: both are drastic
departures from standard First Amendment jurisprudence in that
they presumptively favor regulation.
Thus, while the Court certainly could decide that a legislature
need only act rationally to restrict speech toward children, this ap-
proach is difficult to analogize to Ginsberg and would essentially lead
to the same result anyway.  For these reasons discussion focuses on
Ginsberg as supplying a rational basis test for recognizing catego-
ries—that is, as a replacement for the tradition inquiry in Stevens.
C. Such a Drastic Departure from Standard Methodology Is
Inconsistent with the Court’s Past Treatment of
Speech Toward Children
By this point it is clear the way in which Ginsberg would likely
apply: It provides no precedent on point for the question of First
Amendment protection, but, because the Court in Ginsberg effectively
created a new area of unprotected speech for children, the same ra-
tional basis test might still apply for recognizing categories of speech
toward children.  Some may agree that the low bar of a rational basis
test is preferable, so as to give legislatures more flexibility in protect-
ing the ears of youths.  However, free speech jurisprudence provides
little warrant for such legislative flexibility in the case of child audi-
ences where the First Amendment generally guards individual speech
rights so strictly.
Granted, the Supreme Court has dealt infrequently with speech
toward children,197 so the inferences regarding its treatment of such
cases are limited.  But in those few cases, the Court has approached
such speech almost as it would with an adult audience in the sense
196. See supra subsection III.B.1.
197. The following analysis excludes discussion of children’s rights in school settings.
This is not for a lack of First Amendment protection.  On the contrary, the Court
has long found children do not shed their First Amendment rights in school,
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), and that
one of the best ways to give them an appreciation for the ideals on which democ-
racy is founded is to give substance to their free speech rights, W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638–39 (1943).  But while these school cases
contain some relevant insight, they are heavily clouded by the setting.  Because
schools and local governments have interests in educating children and because
schools require a certain level of authoritarianism, the interests and rights in-
volved compare awkwardly with those at issue in Entertainment Merchants.
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that it grounded its discussion in familiar speech categories and ex-
pressly limited any special treatment for child audiences.  Although
this does not show identical protection of speech toward children, it
does suggest that such speech is at least guided by the same principles
and is protected under a substantially similar First Amendment
framework.
1. Categorization for Speech with Child Audiences
The Court’s past dealing with speech toward children implies
treatment parallel to standard categorization practice.  In the cases
dealing specifically with speech toward children, the Court discussed
categorization by turning its analysis on whether some speech fits
within the definition of an established exception.  By basing protection
consistently on speech type, the Court has shown that even if First
Amendment protection is not “coextensive” for children, its analytical
framework is substantially the same.
Even in Ginsberg itself, the Court does not advocate for the dismis-
sal of categorization methodology.  Instead the Court simply tinkered
with the definition.198  By acknowledging this was a mere definition
adjustment, the Court showed that it was still operating squarely
within the categorization framework.  In fact, the Court’s whole dis-
cussion was based on the existing category of obscenity,199 allowing
some flexibility but maintaining a short tether to the category’s stan-
dard definition.200
Similarly, the Court in Erznoznik recognized the expanded defini-
tion from Ginsberg to include certain non-obscene sexual material but
understood this category to still retain limited boundaries.201  It rec-
ognized that speech must at least be substantially sexual for this cate-
gorical exception to apply—even for children.202  Accordingly, the
Court noted that outside of these categories a legislature simply can-
not regulate ideas it finds unsuitable.203  By thus establishing catego-
ries as the means of determining protection and requiring obscenity’s
variable definition to be definitively sexual, the Court clearly deter-
mined protection by applying categorization methodology.
198. See discussion supra in section III.A.
199. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1968).
200. Ginsberg gave judges some flexibility to take circumstances into account, but this
flexibility could not be used to permit a ban of showing any nudity, or of regulat-
ing offensive, but non-sexual content. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 213–14 (1975).  Thus, even with this ability to fluctuate, there were
tight limits as to the extent of the fluctuating definition, still maintaining the
taxonomic “in or out” approach in which the judge must classify according to a
largely-predetermined definition.
201. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212–14.
202. Id. at 213 n.10.
203. Id. at 212–14.
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Even in Pacifica, the Court recognized categorization framework
and grounded its discussion in the obscenity category.  The opinion
was not crystal clear in its reasoning, but it used the obscenity defini-
tion as the foundation for its discussion of profanity.204  And while the
opinion arguably departed somewhat from the categorical framework
by putting weight on the context of the speech, the Court managed to
account for this by using nuisance rationale.205  The commission
whose opinion the Court was reviewing had based its entire discussion
on nuisance theory, in which the circumstances are all-important.206
It was only out of this emphasis that the Court was willing to account
for these circumstances and stretch its categorization foundation.
The Court has thus been unwilling to depart from its standard cat-
egorization just for children, doing so only on occasion and with appar-
ent reluctance.  Granted, the Court has shown some modification to be
appropriate for speech toward children, but it has otherwise employed
substantially the same categorization as with any other speech.  This
parallelism thwarts the idea that the involvement of minors should
circumvent the concerns expressed in Stevens or result in such a dras-
tic and new scheme of categorization.  As such, categorization under a
rational basis test seems about as unwarranted for minors as for
adults.
2. Substantial Protection with Exceptions Both Limited and
Narrow
In both Ginsberg and Pacifica, the Supreme Court established ex-
ceptions for obscenity-related speech toward children.  Although these
cases show a somewhat more relaxed protection of speech when chil-
dren are the recipients, the Supreme Court limited their applicability
through internal qualifications and later opinions narrowing their
holdings.  These limitations show the exceptions for children are
neither expansive nor universal.
Ginsberg permitted the expansion of obscenity for children, but the
Court itself qualified the expansion of the obscenity category as “sim-
ply adjust[ing] the definition.”207  In the next sentence, the Court re-
emphasized that this was all the Court was doing208—not creating or
destroying protections, but merely adjusting them.  The Supreme
Court in Erznoznik emphasized the narrowness of this holding by de-
claring that Ginsberg did not create a broad ability to regulate and is
instead confined to certain circumstances where extra regulation for
204. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 745–46, 749.
205. Id. at 750.
206. Id.
207. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
208. Id.
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children is truly warranted.209  Children thus “are entitled to a signif-
icant measure of First Amendment protection.”210  For example, even
though laws may restrict minors’ access to some non-obscene content,
it must at least be significantly erotic.211  A legislative body cannot
simply regulate sexual speech determined unsuitable for minors, but
it must be legitimately obscene for them.212  Thus, while Ginsberg
does create a more lenient standard, this leniency is tied closely to the
actual obscenity category.
The Court similarly qualified its holding in Pacifica by expressly
emphasizing the narrowness of its decision.213  The particular perva-
siveness of broadcasting, its unique accessibility, and the time of day
were each vital in justifying the expansion of obscenity to include pro-
fanity, such that profanity was still protected under many other cir-
cumstances.214  In a number of later decisions, the Court seized on
this language to distinguish Pacifica from profanity in other media.215
In each of these distinguishing cases, the Court reiterated its state-
ment in Pacifica that the regulability of profanity depended heavily
upon the circumstances.216  And in at least two of these later decisions
the Court specifically noted the uniquely pervasive and nuisance-like
qualities of broadcasting.217  While Pacifica can be seen as creating
special treatment based partially on protection of children, the Court
has explicitly confined this treatment to specific circumstances show-
ing that having minors in the audience is but one of many factors be-
hind this holding.
The Court’s holdings in Ginsberg and Pacifica are two of the most
emblematic cases behind the special treatment of speech toward chil-
dren.218  But while both involve more flexible protection for such
speech, the Court has closely guarded such leniency by limiting its
applicability and clearly establishing substantial protection for chil-
209. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1975).
210. Id. at 212.
211. Id. at 213 n.10.
212. Id. at 213–14.
213. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
214. See, e.g., supra note 108 and accompanying text.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127–28 (1989); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
218. C.f. Richard P. Salgado, Regulating a Video Revolution, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
516, 520 (1989) (discussing these two cases in tandem as establishing the ex-
panded scope of obscenity for children); Eric J. Segall, In the Name of the Chil-
dren: Government Regulation of Indecency on the Radio, Television, and the
Internet—Let’s Stop the Madness, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 697, 700 (2009)
(showing Ginsberg to create a number of “infections” in the Court’s First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and Pacifica to be one of the most serious of these
“infections”).
2013] CHILDREN AND CATEGORIZATION 1027
dren’s access to speech.  Were the Court to apply Justice Alito’s ra-
tional basis test outside of its original context (where it was used to
justify using children as a “circumstance” for defining obscenity) for
the purpose of restructuring First Amendment analysis for speech to-
ward children, it would extend past the limited applicability of these
two cases.  The fact that the Court emphatically limited the holdings
in both Ginsberg and Pacifica opposes using them to establish such a
distinctly separate protection for children, particularly since such a
method contains a heavy presumption against the right-holder.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent clarity added by the Stevens opinion, differ-
ences of opinion still exist in the Court as to its applicability.  This
disagreement showed itself in Entertainment Merchants in the form of
a dispute over whether the tradition analysis in Stevens applied re-
gardless of the speech recipient—in this instance, minors.  But while
restrictions on speech toward children sometimes do receive more le-
nient First Amendment treatment, the Court has interpreted such
flexibility narrowly and kept its analysis fairly closely tied to standard
First Amendment analysis.  Accordingly, the Court’s majority stead-
ied First Amendment analysis by maintaining the Stevens method of
recognizing categories, reaffirming that courts do not create categories
but merely recognize categories forged by tradition.  More so, the
Court’s use of this framework, despite the added complication of an
audience of children, clearly shows that such speech is indeed gov-
erned by the same underlying principles as with an adult audience.219
In so doing, the Court did not reach greatly beyond existing case law.
Instead, it added clarity and consistency to an often complicated First
Amendment jurisprudence.
219. One might still debate the closeness of this treatment.  Instead of asking, “Does
violent expression have a history of exemption from the First Amendment?” the
Court seemed to look at the question in terms of the relevant recipient: “Is there a
history of exempting violent speech toward children?”  Thus, despite retaining
the same general analysis as Stevens, the Court appears to modify it to maintain
some distinction between adult and child recipients.  This, however, is an issue
for another article.
1028 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:998
